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During the first week of December, the U.S. President hosted the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. His pledge was an end to decades of conflict in the turbulent eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Shortly after, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, hitting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President declared, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Change of Direction

This contrast encapsulates the central principle of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a stepping back from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on economic deals and ending wars—though how this fits with the nascent aerial operations in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a high-ranking U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative stated this, saying the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Contradictions

This change is consequential, but analysts note it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is influenced by the President’s personal style, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a senior fellow for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis predicts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

International Disinterest and Friction

Unlike his recent predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major feud has erupted with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Engagement and Selective Action

A similar standoff appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the forceful rhetoric may have spurred the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

Similar to Other Powers

Experts see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” she added.